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The Interest Free Loan: An Effective Gift and
Estate Planning Device
INTRODUCTION

Interest free loans have recently come under attack from the Internal Revenue Service.' These loans are generally made between
family members and provide for repayment after a fixed term or on
demand. The Service argues that the interest free use of funds constitutes a gift equal to the value of the use of funds loaned,' relying
on the broad language of sections 2501, 2511 and 2512 of the Internal
Revenue Code 3 and the Treasury Regulations promulgated thereunder.4 Despite the Service's position, the courts have consistently
held that the interest free use of funds does not constitute a gift for
Federal gift tax purposes. 5 Thus, the interest free loan may be a
useful tax planning mechanism, enabling the lender to shift income
to the borrower without incurring gift tax. This note will discuss the
use of the interest free loan as an effective tax planning device in
light of recent court decisions. The note will also discuss policy
considerations which could justify legislative reform in this area.
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

The Service's position that an interest free loan results in a taxable gift is based on statutory authority in existence since the crea1. See Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978), aff'g 67 T.C. 1060 (1977);
Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966). Although the attack on the
interest free loan is recent, the Service's position is based on provisions of the Federal gift
tax that have existed since its enactment in 1932.
2. See Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408.
3. I.R.C. § 2501(a) imposes a gift tax "on the transfer of property by gift . . . by any
individual" including any type of interest whether real or personal, tangible or intangible.
I.R.C. § 2511 affirms the broad scope to be accorded § 2501.
I.R.C. § 2512 provides in pertinent part: "Where property is transferred for less than an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, then the amount by which the
value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration shall be deemed a gift ....
4. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1977), which states that the gift tax applies to "gifts
indirectly made" and includes "all transactions whereby property or property rights or interests are gratuitously passed or conferred upon another, regardless of the means or device
employed ..
"
The legislative history of the tax provides further amplification. See, e.g., H.R. No. 708
Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28 (1932); S. Rep. No. 665, 72 Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1932), which states in
pertinent part: "the terms 'property,' 'transfer,' 'gift,' and 'indirectly' are used in the broadest
most comprehensive sense" for Federal gift tax purposes.
5. See Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978), aff'g 67 T.C. 1060 (1977);
Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
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tion of the Federal gift tax in 1932.6 The gift transfer tax laws are
designed to supplement the Federal estate and income tax statutes.7
Accordingly, the language of the Federal gift tax provisions is broad
in scope.' A taxable gift occurs when an individual makes a complete transfer of property for less than full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth, and for other than a bona fide
business purpose.'
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976,1 lifetime gifts (as opposed
to testamentary transfers) could effect a net tax savings to the transferor. The combination of three provisions was primarily responsible
for this savings: (1) lifetime transfers were taxed at a substantially
lower rate;" (2) a $30,000 lifetime exemption was permitted, and
(3) an annual $3,000 per-donee gift tax exclusion was allowed.'" The
6. Revenue Act of 1932, §§ 501-532, 47 Stat. 245-59 (now I.R.C. §§ 2501-2523).
7. See 65 Cong. Rec. 3119-20, 8095-96 (1924). Committee Reports on the 1932 Revenue
Act stressed that the gift tax was to aid in the prevention of income and estate tax avoidance.
H.R. Rep. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1932); S. Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1932).
See generally C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GirT TAXES §22.2 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as LOWNDES, KRAMER & McCoRD]; Magill, The Federal Gift Tax, 40
COLUM. L. REv. 773 (1940); Warren, Correlationof Gift and Estate Taxes, 55 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1941); Harris, Legislative History of Federal Gift Taxation, 18 TAXES 531, 533 (1940). See
also 75 Cong. Rec. 5691 (1932), where Rep. Crisp stated that the enactment of the gift tax
was to serve as a "mother" to protect the estate tax from being evaded. Rep. Crisp authored
§ 501 of the Internal Revenue Act of 1930 (the predecessor of I.R.C. § 2501).
8. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 2501 and 2511. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
The Service, in promulgating its treasury regulations, has been expansive in determining
what constitutes a taxable transfer. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2501-1(a) and 25.2511-1(c)
(1958). See also note 4 supra and accompanying text.
9. Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945). However, although some transfers
subject to gift tax are expressly recognized in I.R.C. §§ 2511-2517, Congress has not clearly
defined what constitutes a taxable gift. See I.R.C. § 2501; R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S.
LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIr TAXATION 8-3 (3d ed. 1974). One judicial method employed
in determining whether a particular transaction is a taxable gift is to consider the outcome
of an analagous situation under relevant estate or income tax section. See, e.g., Bromley v.
McCaughny, 280 U.S. 124 (1929), where the constitutionality of the gift tax was attacked on
the grounds of being a direct tax. The Court analogized the tax to the similar estate tax
situation, of Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900), where the estate tax was held to be
indirect. The Bromley Court found no substantive difference between the two forms of transfer. It held that the gift tax on inter-vivos transfers was indirect and thus constitutional. 280
U.S. at 137-38.
10. Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 2501-2523, 90 Stat. 1520.
11. I.R.C. § 2502(a)(2) (repealed 1976). A comparison of the gift and estate rate tables
indicates that the gift tax rates were exactly 75% of the estate tax rates. See I.R.C. §§ 2001
and 2502 (repealed 1976).
12. See I.R.C. § 2521 (repealed 1976), which provided in pertinent part: "In computing
taxable gifts. . . there shall be allowed as a deduction . . . an exemption of $30,000. . . for
which the tax is being computed under the laws applicable to such years or calendar quarters."
13. I.R.C. § 2503(b), which provides in pertinent part: "In computing taxable gifts for the
calendar quarter in the case of gifts. . . made to any person by the donor. . . $3,000 of such
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1976 Tax Reform Act sought to remedy this inequity by requiring
that the value of property transferred by lifetime gifts be added to
the donor's gross estate when determining the decedent's estate tax
base." In addition, Congress revoked the $30,000 lifetime gift tax
exemption and replaced the different estate and gift tax rates with
a uniform rate structure.' 5 Based on these legislative changes, lifetime transfers in excess of the annual $3,000 per-donee exclusion are
no longer as beneficial as they were prior to the Tax Reform Act. 6
CASES DETERMINING THE

GIFT TAXABILITY

OF THE INTEREST FREE LOAN

An early Tax Court case, Gertrude E. Blackburn,' 7 concerned an
intra-family deferred payment sale of real estate. 8 The taxpayer
transferred real property to her children in exchange for 2.25% interest bearing promissory notes to be paid monthly over 34.5 years.'"
The court determined that the prevailing rate of interest on real
estate mortgage loans at the time of the transfer was 4% per annum.
20 Although the Tax Court recognized that the taxpayer intended the
notes to be paid in full, it found that the difference between the fair
market value of the real property and the promissory notes as of the
date of the transfer constituted a taxable gift. 2' The court calculated
the present value of the notes based on the prevailing interest rate
at the date of the transfer. The difference between the prevailing
rate and the actual interest charged constituted a taxable gift.2"
The first case to face squarely whether an interest free loan results
gifts to such person ... during ... the calendar year shall not ... be included in the total
amount of gifts made ..
"
14. I.R.C. § 2001(b). But see I.R.C. § 2035 for a technical exception. See note 16 infra for
a discussion of § 2035.
15. See § 2001(b) (1976).
16. An inter vivos transfer may still be preferred where property is almost certain to
appreciate. If the transfer is made more than three years before the date of death, the
appreciation between the date of the transfer and the date of death is not subject to a transfer
tax. See I.R.C. § 2035(a) which provides in pertinent part: "[Tihe value of the gross estate
shall include the value of all property to the extent of any interest . . . of which the decedent
has at anytime made a transfer . . .during the 3-year period ending on the date of the
decedent's death." However, I.R.C. § 2035(b) excludes any gift made by reason of the $3,000
annual gift tax exclusion.
17. 20 T.C. 204 (1953).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 206-07.
21. Id. at 207.
22. Id. The acturial determination of the present value of property as applied by the
Blackburn court is a common method used by the courts to ascertain the value of property
as of the date it is transferred. See e.g., Mason v. United States, 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975);
Commissioner v. Edwards, 135 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1943).
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in a gift was Johnson v. United States.21 In Johnson, the taxpayers
consistently made bona fide loans to their two children for various
purposes. The loans were repayable on demand without interest."
Each child later executed a non-interest bearing demand note in an
amount equal to the balance then outstanding on all of their noninterest bearing debts, and they paid all but a small portion of these
notes.25 The Service asserted that in each of the years while the
interest free notes were outstanding the taxpayers had made a gift
to their children. The Service calculated the amount of the gift to
be the value of the use of the money equal to the then prevailing
rate of interest multiplied by the then unpaid balance."
The district court recognized that one purpose of the gift tax was
to prevent the avoidance of the estate tax by means of lifetime
gifts.Y It found, however, that the loans made by the Johnsons did
not defeat that purpose. The interest free loans created no possibility of estate tax avoidance since the loaned funds would be included
in the lenders' gross estates even if not repaid before their deaths."
In addition, the court noted that under Texas law the loans were not
gifts in the absence of any express, implied, or statutory duty to pay
interest.3 In holding for the taxpayers, the court noted that the
imposition of a gift tax on the use of money should be mandated by
31
the Congress and not the courts.
Despite the holding in Johnson, the Service refused to follow the
district court's decision in regard to the gift taxability of interest
free demand loans.32 Rev. Rul. 73-61 considered the gift tax consequences of an interest free, intra-family loan factually similar to the
loan in Johnson.33 Taxpayer advanced $250,000 to his son's corporation in exchange for two promissory notes from the corporation. One
note was payable at a fixed term, the other payable on demand.
Both provided for repayment of the principal sum without interest.3 4
23. 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
24. Id. at 74.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 76-77.
27. Id. at 77. The purpose of the gift tax laws is to prevent evasion of estate taxes through
reduction of an estate by inter vivos gifts. See Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106, 107
(1950).
28. 254 F. Supp. at 77.
29. Id.
30. Id. The court reasoned that the lenders' gross estates would be the same if the loaned
funds were allowed to "lay fallow". In addition, the court found no legal requirement for a
parent to deal at arm's length with his children. Id.
31. Id. The Service did not appeal.
32. Rev. Rul. 73-61 1973-1 C.B. 408.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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The Service ruled that the right to use money is an interest in
property and the transfer of this right constitutes a taxable gift
under section 2501 unless full and adequate consideration in money
or money's worth is received.3 The Service relied on Blackburn,
ruling that a note payable at a fixed time, bearing no interest, is
subject to gift tax. This note was subject to the gift tax because the
value of the right to use the loaned funds could be ascertained on
the date the money and the note were exchanged. 36 The Service also
found a taxable gift in regard to the interest free demand note. Since
that note's value was not ascertainable as of the date of exchange,
the Service ruled that the value of the gift was to be determined at
the end of each calendar quarter when use of the funds is permitted. 3 Both the Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit rejected this
position in the recent case of Crown v. Commission.3
CROWN V. COMMISSIONER

The Tax Court Decision
In Crown,u the taxpayer was one of three equal partners in Areljay Company."0 Areljay made substantial interest free loans, represented by demand notes and open accounts, to the taxpayer's childrens' trusts." The open accounts made no provision for interest.
The demand notes did not provide for interest before demand, but
they were to accrue at 6% after demand.42 The Service characterized
35. Id.
36. Id. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5 (1958).
37. Rev. Rule. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408, 409. The value of the gift will be determined by
the prevailing interest rate as of the end of the calendar quarter. The Service observed that
the annual $3,000 per-donee exclusion would shelter most annual gifts. Id. For example,
assuming an annual interest rate of 6%, a $50,000 interest free demand loan ($100,000 if the
loan is made jointly) may be made to each borrower without resulting in a taxable gift. Id.
See also Republic Petroeleum Corp. v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1975),
where an intra-family loan was evidenced by a note which called for the payment of interest
at an annual rate of two percent. The loan was repaid in full as to principal but the interest
obligation was forgiven. The court found a gift was made to the extent of the interest gratuitously forgiven. Id. at 917-18.
38. 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978), aff'g 67 T.C. 1060 (1977).
39. 67 T.C. 1960 (1977) (Four judges dissented and three judges did not participate in the
consideration and disposition of the case).
40. Id. at 1060.
41. Id. at 1060-61. As of December 31, 1967, the demand notes totalled $2,073,649 and the
open accounts totaled $15,956,375. All of the loans were bona fide and properly recorded in
Areljay's books as well as in the books of the respective trust. Id.
In 1967, the Areljay partners had, in addition to 12 such trusts for their children, one trust
to a first cousin and eleven to children of the partners' first cousins. All of these trusts had
loans outstanding to the partners. Id. at 1060.
42. Id. at 1061. This note will refer to demand notes and not to open accounts, since the
Crown court apparently treated them as one and the same.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 10

the interest free loans as transfers subject to the gift tax. It determined that the value of the gift was the interest that would have
been charged had the parties been dealing at arm's length." The
Service used sections 2501 and 2511 of the Internal Revenue Code
to justify its determination." Thus, for the 1967 taxable year, the
Service calculated a gift tax deficiency based on the partnership's
interest free loans, one third of which were attributed to the taxpayer.4 5
The Tax Court held for the taxpayer, ruling that an interest free
loan between relatives did not constitute a taxable gift where the
parties had not provided for the payment of interest." The Tax
Court recognized that Congress enacted the Federal gift tax statute
to prevent income and estate tax evasion,4 7 and that the statute
should be read expansively so as to reach all gratuitous transfers of
property and property rights." However, the court was troubled by
the Commissioner's assertion of a new position based on old statutory authority," especially since no other court had yet accepted this
stance.50 The Tax Court decided that Johnson should control, and
held that the use of money is not a transferred property right.5'
In reaching its decision, the court addressed several of the Commissioner's contentions. The Commissioner's first argument was
that allowing the interest free use of money to escape gift taxation
would result in the reduction of the lender's gross estate." The Tax
43. Id. The Commissioner set forth the position stated in Rev. Rule. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B.
408, where the Service ruled: "The right to use property, in this case money, is itself an
interest in property, the transfer of which is a gift within the purview of Section 2501 of the
Code unless full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth is received." In
referring to the determination of the value of a gift evidenced by demand notes, the Service
stated: "The value. . . is calculable as of the last day of each calendar quarter during which
[the borrower] has been granted such use." Id. at 409. See notes 32-37 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Rev. Rule 73-61.
44. 67 T.C. at 1061. See note 3 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of I.R.C. §§
2501 and 2511.
45. 67 T.C. at 1061-62. The Commissioner determined that parties bargaining at arm's
length would have charged six percent interest per annum on both the demand notes and the
open account loans, resulting in a tax liability of $1,086,407.75 for the partnership. Id. at 106162.
46. Id. at 1064.
47. See Harris, Legislative History of Federal Gift Taxation, 18 TAXES 531, 536 (1940),
which quoted Mr. Ogden Mills, former member of the U.S. Treasury, as saying: "[Tihe
purpose of a gift tax is not to raise revenue . . . but to prevent evasion of either the estate or
the income tax." See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
48. 67 T.C. at 1063.
49. Id. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
50. 67 T.C. at 1064.
51. Id. at 1062-63. See note 4 supra for the text of Treas. Reg. § 25.2511 -1(c) (1977), which
sets forth the Service's guidelines on what constitutes a taxable gift.
52. 67 T.C. at 1063.
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Court rejected this argument, recognizing that outstanding loans
are included in the lender's gross estate. Therefore, estate taxes
would not be reduced as a result of such transactions.5 3 The Commissioner also charged that the use of interest free money constitutes a taxable property right.5' The court disagreed, however, because it found no contractual or statutory obligation to charge interest. 55 Since the Crown loans were interest free, the court determined
that the Commissioner's argument was without substance.5"
The majority found additional support for its holding in analagous income tax situations. Cases in that area have consistently
held that the interest free use of funds does not constitute interest
income to the borrower. 7 The court refused to expand the Federal
gift tax statute to encompass the value of the use of money on an
interest free loan, and indicated that such action should come from
Congress.58 The Tax Court also feared that an unmanageable administrative burden would be created if the use of money or property were found to be a taxable gift. 59
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1064, quoting Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73, 77 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
If a specific Code section were applicable, it would control, based on the supremacy clause.
U.S. CONST., art. IV, cl.2. See MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION §
1.01 (1959). Where no specific code provision is applicable, however, state law controls. See
Burnett v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932), which held that the right to receive interest when
not provided in a contract is a state question.
In Crown, the property law of Illinois controlled. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 74, § 4 (1977) provides
in pertinent part: "(1) In all written contracts it shall be lawful for the parties to stipulate or
agree that 8% per annum, or any less sum of interest, shall be . . .paid upon every $100 of
money loaned ..
" The statute indicates a maximum rate but does not provide that a
minimum rate of interest must be charged. See generally Note, Federal Estate and Gift
Taxation, 9 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 579, 583 and n.33 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Federal Estateand
Gift Taxation].
55. 67 T.C. at 1064.
56. Id.
57. Id. See, e.g., J. Simpson Dean, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961) nonacq., 1973-2 C.B. 4, where the
Tax Court held that the shareholders of a coproration who received interest free loans from
that corporation did not have an increase in taxable income to the extent of the value of the
use of the loaned funds. The Tax Court in Crown relied on Saunders v. United States, 294 F.
Supp. 1276 (D. Hawaii 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 450 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1971). In
Saunders, the taxpayer received non-interest bearing loans in return for services rendered.
The court held that although no obligaton existed for the payment of interest, the lack of such
a provision did not justify the imputation of income to the borrower. This supports the general
proposition that the gift tax does not apply to the rendering of gratuitous services but only
to transfers of property. See I.R.C. § 2501; R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIr TAXATION 9-7 to 9-8 (3d ed. 1974). See also Lupowitz Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 497 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1974), where the Circuit Court held that corporate interest free
advances made to a related corporation, where the obligations were bona fide, did not result
in a constructive dividend.
58. 67 T.C. at 1064.
59. Id. at 1065.
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In his dissenting opinion in Crown, Judge Simpson argued that
an interest free loan is a taxable gift.60 To hold otherwise, he declared, is inconsistent with the explicit terms of the relevant statute,"' Treasury Regulations, and legislative history, 3 as well as the
Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of the applicable statute. 6' The dissent claimed that the majority had ignored the economic reality of the interest free transfer. If the taxpayer had arranged for the trusts to obtain loans from a financial institution and
had agreed to pay interest on behalf of the trust, the payment would
have clearly resulted in a taxable gift. 5 The mere use of a different
form to convey the desired benefit to the transferee should not justify a different taxable result.66
The dissent relied primarily on Blackburn.7 Judge Simpson refused to accept his colleagues' finding that the gross estate was not
depleted as a result of the interest free loan. 8 He argued that the
gross estate lost money equal to the amount of interest that could
6
Additionally, if a taxpayer
have been earned on the funds loanedY.
may deduct, for income tax purposes, the value of the gratuitous use
of property by charitable institutions, then the converse situation
of an interest free loan must result in a taxable gift.7 0
60. Id. Three other judges joined in the dissent.
61. See I.R.C. § 2501.
62. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1 (1977).
63. See H.R. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1932); S. Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. 39 (1932).
64. 67 T.C. at 1066-67. See Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1945); Commissioner v.
Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945); Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 286 (1932).
65. 67 T.C. at 1066.
66. Id. at 1066-67. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935).
67. 67 T.C. at 1068. See notes 17 through 22 supraand accompanying text. Judge Simpson
found no reason to distinguish between the interest bearing notes in Blackburn and the notes
used in Crown, because neither charged the prevailing rate for the use of the funds loaned.
67 T.C. at 1068. However, the facts in Blackburn may be distinguishable from Crown because
the loans in Blackburn were exchanged for real property whereas in Crown the loans were
exchanged for the use of money. In cases such as Blackburn, the relative ease of determining
the fair market value of real property at the date of transfer facilitates the finding of a taxable
gift. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1977).
68. 67 T.C. at 1069.
69. Id. at 1069-70. Judge Simpson indicated that the majority's reliance on the holding
in J. Simpson Dean, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961), was incorrect. Judge Simpson's interpretation of
the Dean holding was not, as the majority suggested, that interest free loans fail to produce
income, but that such*loans did not result in taxable income since offsetting deductions
would have existed. 67 T.C. at 1070.
70. See, e.g., Thriftimart, Inc., 59 T.C. 598, 615 (1973), remanded on otherissues by order
(9th Cir. 1975); John G. Allen, 57 T.C. 12, 13 (1971); Priscilla M. Sullivan, 16 T.C. 228,231
(1951). However, I.R.C. § 170 was amended by The Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-172,
§ 201(a)(2)(A), 83 Stat. 558, with the result that the transactions in the cases cited above
are no longer deductible for income tax purposes. See I.R.C. § .170(0(3). See also Rev. Rul.
70-477, 1970-2 C.B. 62.
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The dissent also disagreed with the majority's policy determination,7 ' rejecting the contention that an unmanageable administrative burden would result if interest free loans were found to constitute a taxable gift. 2 He emphasized that most intra-family transfers
would not be considered taxable events since they would fall within
the limit of the annual $3,000 per-donee gift tax exclusion.73 Finally,
Judge Simpson recognized that the Service may have taken a new
position based on old Code provisions. However, he defended the
Service's action, citing the well settled doctrine that the Service
may adopt a new interpretation of the law if it decides that its
74
earlier determination was incorrect.
Seventh Circuit Opinion
Defeated in the Tax Court, the Commissioner appealed to the
Seventh Circuit.75 On appeal, the Commissioner made two major
arguments. First, the granting of a loan where the interest charged
is below the prevailing rate constitutes either an unequal exchange
between parties or an outright gift of a property right that confers
an economic benefit upon the borrower.7" Second, the failure to tax
the use of interest free demand loans would be inconsistent with the
tax treatment accorded other practical alternatives where an economic benefit is transferred.77
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision. It concurred with the Tax Court's observation that the judiciary is reluctant to impute interest income without explicit congressional authority.7 8 Although the court recognized the validity of the Commissioner's arguments in the abstract, it found no justification in either
71. 67 T.C. at 1070.
72. Id.
73. Id. See I.R.C. § 2503.
74. 67 T.C. at 1070. See Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965); Automobile Club of
Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957). The dissent questioned whether the Commissioner's interpretation was actually new. 67 T.C. at 1070. However, the dissent did not cite
any precedent that would substantiate a pre-existing position.
The dissent appears to be concerned that a transfer of this magnitude could escape the gift
tax and thus attempted to find that this particular transaction was different than most intrafamily transfers. It seems to suggest that Crown should be analyzed outside the protection of
an intra-family transfer.
75. 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978). After the case had been argued but prior to the court's
opinion, the Service decided that it would not follow the district court's holding in Johnson.
1978-22 I.R.B. 6. It is interesting to note that the Service did not issue its nonacquiescence
until 12 years after Johnson was decided.
76. 585 F.2d at 235.
77. Id. at 237.
78. Id. at 240. See notes 57 and 58 supra.
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the Code or its legislative history for taxing the use of interest free
funds."9
The court acknowledged that interest free loans are most effective
when they divert income from the lender, who is in a high tax
bracket, to the borrower, who is in a lower tax bracket. 9 However,
the court determined that the only issue on appeal was the effect of
interest free loans on estate taxes. In regard to the Commissioner's
first argument, it found that where non-interest bearing demand
notes are involved, the fair market value of the promise to pay
remains equal to the principal amount loaned.8 The Commissioner
believed that the taxpayer had conveyed the value of the use of the
funds tax free to the borrowers. To prevent these benefits from
escaping taxation, he asserted that a fair rate of interest should be
imputed." Relying on Johnson, the court concluded that a taxpayer
has no duty to continuously invest his money for the purpose of
obtaining a profit. 3 Therefore, interest may not be imputed84 unless
the loan contains a provision for its payment. 5
As part of its determination that interest not be imputed to the
Crown loans, the court rejected the unique valuation technique sug79. The Appellate Court, like the Tax Court, remained unconvinced that the broad drafting of gift tax §§ 2501 and 2512(b) provided the statutory language necessary to support the
commissioner's position. Id.
80. Id. at 235-36. However, whether loans give rise to constructive income under the
income tax was not before the Crown court. Id. at 236 n.3.
81. Id. at 236. "This fact led the Tax Court below and the district court in Johnson-the
only reported decision on all fours with the case at bar-to conclude that the government's
interest in taxing the estate of the lender had not been affected." Id. (citation omitted). But
see Note, Gift Taxation of Interest Free Loans, 19 STAN. L. Rav. 870, 874 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Interest Free Loans], cited in the opinion to support the Commissioner's position,
"that if the lender had retained the money loaned and invested it in income producing assets,
his taxable estate would have grown larger by the amount of income earned." 585 F.2d at
236.
82. Id. at 240. Relying on Blackburn, the Commissoner attempted to show that the taxpayer in Crown was constructively receiving interest payments on money loaned and then
making constructive transfers to the borrower. Id.
83. Id. at 236.
84. Id. at 240. The court determined that if interest were imputed, it would result in a
tax being imposed on what the lender could have done rather than what he did. Id. The
Commissioner's arguments if accepted by the court, would result in treating an interest free
loan as if it were forgiveness of debt. Such a position would require the assumption that the
lender had the right to receive interest on the loan and then forgave its repayment. The
forgiveness of debt does in fact create a taxable gift at the time of the forgiveness. See Treas.
Reg. § 25.2511-1(a) (1973). See also LOWNDES, KRAm & McCoRD, supra note 7, at § 26.12.
This result suggests that a lender must charge interest on the use of money.loaned, when in
fact he has no legal obligation to do so.
85. Id. at 239. The Commissioner may impute interest in a contract only if the Code so
provides. See note 128, infra, which discusses the imputation of interest on installment sales
contracts under I.R.C. § 483.
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gested by the Commissioner. The Commissioner contended that the
use of interest free funds should be assessed in terms of the discounted present value of the loan."6 However, the court found that
the present value could range anywhere from zero up to the face
value of the notes. 7 Since demand notes do not state when repayment is to be made,88 the value of the use of money is unknown and
unknowable at the time the loan is made. 8 The court therefore
refused to accept the Commissioner's valuation method, since section 2512(a) requires that a gift be valued as of the date it is made."'
The Court also faulted the Commissioner's valuation method because it implies that a lender intends a loan to be outstanding
during the period interest is to be imputed.' This approach would
require the Service to determine the subjective intent of the lender,
a practice the Code does not sanction. 2 Further, the court noted
that application of the Commissioner's technique could result in a
larger tax than would result if an outright gift of the principal had
been made.

3

86. Id. The Commissioner applied the same argument used in Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B.
408, which stated that the right to use property, in this case money, is itself an interest in
property and may be ascertained by actuarial methods prescribed by Treas. Reg. § 25.25125 (1973). The value is determined as of the last day of each quarter during which the lender
has had use of the funds. Rev. Rul. 73-61 at 409. See notes 32 through 37 supra and accompanying text.
87. 585 F.2d at 238. The court found that the present value will vary based on when
demand is made. Thus, if demand is made immediately after the loan is executed, the present
value will approximate the face value, whereas if the loan remains perpetually unpaid, the
present value approaches zero. Id. at 238 n.138.
88. Id. at 238 and n.12.
89. Id. at 238.
90. Id. at 239. See I.R.C. § 2512(a). When determining the value of property transferred,
"the date of the gift shall be considered the amount of the gift." The economic benefit of the
use of interest free funds is unascertainable at the time of the transfer since it is totally
dependent on the lender's willingness to refrain from demanding repayment, and thus an
incomplete gift. 535 F.2d at 238.
91. Id. at 238-39.
92. See H.R. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1932); S. Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. 39 (1932) where the legislative history suggests that all transfers intended as gifts
should be subject to the gift tax. However, the subjective donative intent criterion has been
cast aside in favor of an objective "workable external test". The court determined that based
on the objective test of § 2512, an unequal exchange had not taken place. 585 F.2d at 238.
See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1) (1973), which in pertinent part provides:
Donative intent on the part of the transferor is not an essential element in the
application of the gift tax to the transfer. The applicaton of the tax is based on the
objective facts of the transfer and the circumstances under which it is made, rather
than on the subjective motive of the donor. . ..
93. 585 F.2d at 239. The court substantiated this view with the following example:
If a lender makes a $1,000 no-interest loan and the "proper" interest rate is 10%
under the IRS formula he would be treated as having made a gift of $100 in each
year the loan remains outstanding. Thus, if the loan remains outstanding for 20
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The Seventh Circuit then rejected the Commissioner's second
contention that the failure to tax interest free loans makes them an
attractive alternative to similar transfers that result in a gift tax."
Following the Commissioner's suggestion, the court compared the
effect of an interest free demand loan to a monetary contribution
made to a trust which is irrevocable for a certain duration. 5 In the
case of an irrevocable trust, a gift occurs at the time of the transfer.
The value of the gift is determined by computing the present discounted value of the income interest payable to the beneficiaries."
However, the court found that a no-interest loan repayable on demand is actually more analogous to a contribution made to a revocable trust, where the income payments to the beneficiary are considered to be gifts from the grantor during each calendar year the
payments are received. 7 The court distinguished between the nointerest loan and the revocable trust situations because the beneficiary of a revocable trust receives income produced by the trust's
corpus, while the borrower of an interest free demand loan receives
only the opportunity to use the capital. Thus, the Commissioner
failed to persuade the court that interest free demand loans are
comparable to other transfers subject to gift taxes.
In declining to hold that the value of the use of interest free
demand loans should be taxed, the court noted two policy considerations which militated against adoption of the Commissioner's position.99 First any transfer deemed to be made "for less than money's
worth" in excess of $3,000 per-donee per-year would give rise to gift
taxation.IN Second, adopting the Commissioner's position would
years, he will be treated as having made gifts totalling $2,000, whereas he would
only have been taxed on $1,000 if he had made a gift of the principal in the first
place . ..
Id. at 239 n.14.
94. Id. at 237.
95. Id.
96. Id. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (1973) which states in pertinent part: "If a donor
transfers by gift less than his entire interest in property [such as an irrevocable transfer for
a term of years], the gift tax is applicable to the interest transferred.
97. 585 F.2d at 237.
98. Id. at 237 n.8. In the case of a revocable trust, a taxable gift results when income
earned from the trust corpus is distributed to the beneficiary. The value of the corpus is
taxable as a gift only upon the grantor's revocation of his power to terminate the trust. Id. at
237.
99. Id. at 240-41.
100. Id. at 241. The court indicated that the same provision categorizing the use of an
$18,000,000 intra-family loan as a taxable gift would lead to the finding of a taxable gift when
"an office worker lends $10 'until next payday'." The same result would occur when "a
neighbor borrows your lawnmower and fails to return it immediately ...
" Id. Thus, as was
the case with I.R.C. § 482, a safe harbor should be provided which would exempt certain
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tacitly approve retroactive application of Rev. Rel. 73-61, in which
the Service refused to follow Johnson.' 0' The Commissioner's broad
discretionary power to apply rulings retroactively is not unfettered
where its use would result in an abuse of that power. 0 Although the
court recognized that theoretical and practical problems exist as a
result of its finding that interest free demand loans are not taxable
events, it held that the decision to subject such transfers to the
03
federal gift tax should be left to Congress.
Judge Van Pelt dissented, relying heavily on the dissenting opinion of Judge Simpson in the Tax Court.'04 He emphasized that sections 2501, 2511, and 2512 of the Code were intended to be applied
broadly,105 and declared that the failure to subject the Crown interest free demand loans-approximately $18 million dollars-to the
0
Federal gift tax "just ain't right".'1
INTEREST FREE LOAN AS AN ESTATE PLANNING DEVICE

The intra-family interest free demand loan is currently an excellent estate planning device. Under Crown, the interest free use of
funds is not a taxable gift. Thus, the lender may make a tax free
conveyance of property, regardless of the amount, without depleting
his annual $3,000 gift tax exclusion for that borrower. Alternatively,
the exclusion may be used to reduce gift tax liability if the Commissioner eventually succeeds in imputing interest on the use of interest
free funds.'0
transfers of property and/or transactions below a threshold duration or dollar value. id. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2 (1954). The court admitted that many of the situations cited would not
be taxed due to the annual $3,000 gift tax exclusion, but it emphasized the need for something
more than the Commissioner's discretion as to what constitutes a taxable gift. 585 F.2d at
240-41.
101. Id. at 241. "Those who administer the Internal Revenue Code unquestionably have
broad authority to make tax rulings and regulations retroactive." Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co.
v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 33 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also I.R.C. Section
7805(b) which provides: "The Secretary or his delegate may prescribe the extent, if any, to
which any ruling or regulation, relating to the Internal Revenue laws, shall be applied without
retroactive effect."
102. 435 U.S. 21 (1978). The Court found that it would not be just or equitable in certain
situations to apply provisions retroactively. Specifically, it found that retroactive application
of a provision which required that taxes be withheld from lunch payments would be inequitable, especially since the legislative history did not justify this result. Id. at 31-32. But see
Wisconsin Nipple and Fabricating Corp. v. Commissioner, 581 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1978)
which upheld the Commissioner's retroactive application of I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(3)(B) and
501(a). These sections prohibit discriminatory employer contributions to defined contribution
plans.
103. 585 F.2d at 241.
104. Judge Van Pelt is a senior district court judge.
105. 585 F.2d at 242.
106. Id. at 242. See note 41 supra.
107. See I.R.C. § 2503.
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The interest free demand loan compares favorably to the grantor
trust. In the case of the interest free loan, the borrower receives the
gratuitous use of money loaned. By contrast, the beneficiary of a
simple revocable trust only receives the income realized from the
investments of the corpus. 08 The income generated by a revocable
trust creates two separate tax liabilities for the grantor. In addition
to being taxed on the income derived from the trust corpus,'"' the
grantor must also pay a gift tax on any income distributed to the
beneficiary."" The imposition of income tax on the grantor usually
results in a greater tax liability since the grantor is typically in a
higher tax bracket than the beneficiary. However, where the lender
creates an interest free demand loan, all income generated from the
funds is taxed to the borrower, who presumably is in a lower tax
bracket than the lender.
The interest free demand loan may also be contrasted with the
Clifford trust."' The latter device results in gift tax liability as soon
as the trust is created, since future income payments from the trust
are capable of present valuation."' In addition, the annual $3,000
exclusion is only available to the grantor in the year the trust is
created." 3 The advantage of the interest free demand loan is that
the lender may forgive $3,000 of principal annually." 4 Even if the
courts or Congress eventually decide that interest should be imputed, the lender may still benefit from the $3,000 exclusion. He
may forgive the amount of interest imputed and reduce the outstanding principal by the amount of the exclusion remaining.
The benefits of an interest free loan over a revocable trust are
clear. The interest free demand loan gives the borrower free access
to the principal on demand, an attribute not available in a Clifford
trust. It also enables the borrower to avoid gift and income taxes for
any income earned on the transferred property, an advantage not
found in a simple revocable trust. Additionally, the creation of a
108. A simple revocable trust provides for all its income to be distributed currently. It
does not provide for distribution of the corpus. See I.R.C. § 651(a).
109. See I.R.C. § 676(a).
110. See Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 283 (1933); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(f)
(1972); H.R. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1932); S. Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. 40 (1932).
111. I.R.C. § 671. The use of a Cliffort trust permits the income derived from the corpus
to be taxed to the beneficiary rather than to the grantor. The trust must be made in favor of
a beneficiary for a definite period, exceeding 10 years.
112. See Aslanides & McGowan, Interest Free Loans Get Green Light as Compensation
and Estate Planning Devices, 21 TAX FOR AccouNTArTS 260, 261 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Green Light].
113. Id.
114. See Hampson, Estate and Gift Taxation, 56 TAxEs 389 (1978).
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trust involves legal formalities and the appointment of a trustee. " '
Both are costly, whereas the making of an interest free demand loan
merely requires the execution of a promissory note. Another important difference is that the trust's status as a taxable entity"' requires preparation of a separate income tax return and satisfaction
of other State and Federal administrative requirements.
The Commissioner has not yet indicated whether he will appeal
Crown to the United States Supreme Court." 7 Thus, the Crown
transfer is currently an effective estate planning mechanism, at
least in the Seventh Circuit."18 However, since the interest free demand loan may still be subject to attack by the Service, these loans
should be legally substantiated to the greatest possible extent."'
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Although a Crown transfer benefits a lender, it allows him to bypass certain Federal income and estate taxes. These transfers undermine the basic purpose of the Federal gift tax' 0 by allowing
income splitting between family members and permitting a possible
reduction in the lender's gross estate. 2' This outcome is particularly
troublesome because it places no limit on the use of the Crown
device.
It is not clear whether the result in Crown depends on the existence of a family relationship between lender and borrower. 2 Failure
115. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, §§ 101-20 (1977).
116. See I.R.C. § 641.
117. It is doubtful whether the Supreme Court would grant certiorari since there is currently no conflict between the circuits regarding the holding in Crown. Further, the Court
might agree with the Seventh Circuit's recommendation that any change in the Crown outcome should come from Congress. Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234, 241 (7th Cir. 1978).
118. See Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742 (1970). At one time the Tax Court did not consider
itself bound by the decisions of any Courts of Appeal, including the one with appellate
jurisdiction over the case under consideration. See Arthur L. Lawrence, 27 T.C. 713 (1957).
In Golsen, the Tax Court reversed itself and held that the Tax Court will "follow a Court of
Appeals decision which is squarely on point where appeal from our decision lies to that Court
of Appeals and to that court alone." 54 T.C. at 757.
119. Hampson, Estate and Gift Taxation, 56 TAXES 389, 394 (1978). The article suggests
that the intra-family interest free demand loan should be secured by collateral and recorded
once executed. The note should be negotiable and should give no indication of the lender's
intent. If possible, the lender should not forgive the debt. However, if a portion of the debt is
forgiven, the lender should figure an interest rate into that amount and file a gift tax return
to start the statute of limitations running. Id. See also 1979 TAX MNGM'T (BNA) Memorandum (Jan. 1, 1979) [hereinafter cited as TAX MNGM'T].
120. See H.R. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1932); S. Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. 40 (1932).
121. See Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106, 107 (1950); Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324
U.S. 303, 307 (1945); Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939).
122. The Crown loans were made between parents and their children. 585 F.2d at 235.
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to establish this relationship could enable courts to distinguish
Crown when a loan is not made between family members. However,
if Crown is not strictly construed, then interest free demand loans
made between friends or between a closely held corporation and its
shareholders may also avoid the gift transfer tax.' Another unresolved issue is whether the Crown decision is applicable when property other than money is. loaned. Thus, a court confronted with a
case where family members are given rent free use of property may
4
refuse to impute a value for the use, based on Crown.
The ramifications of a Crown transfer are also in doubt where the
lender obtains funds from a financial institution in order to make
an intra-family interest free demand loan. In this situation, the
Service may argue not only that a gift tax should be imputed for the
use of the funds, but also that the lender's interest deduction should
not be allowed. A clear analogy exists in Code section 265(2), which
provides that interest on indebtedness incurred to purchase tax exempt obligations is not deductible.'7
Congressional response appears necessary to resolve the questions
which Crown leaves unanswered. The Service has consistently taken
the position that a Crown transfer exalts form over substance, 28 and
the courts apparently concur.'2 However, the courts remain reluctant to impute interest unless it is specifically provided for in the
Code.'2
123. Since corporations are in business to make a profit, they might find it difficult to
justify the making of interest fee demand loans to their shareholders. Also, the borrowershareholder might have to prove that the loans were not actually taxable distributions. See
Green Light, supra note 112, at 264.
124. Tidwell, Lester Crown Points the Way to Estate Tax Reduction under the 1976 Tax
Reform Act, 55 TAXES 651, 654 (1977). The author emphasizes the Tax Court's contention
that "[tihere are policy considerations which militate against viewing the value use of money
or property as a taxable event for gift tax purposes." (emphasis added by Mr. Tidwell). Id.
125. See Green Light, supra note 123 at 265. The article also suggests that the lender is
not entitled to deduct interest payments because he is satisfying an interest obligation that
is not his own. Id.
126. See generally Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978), aff'g 67 T.C. 1060
(1977); Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966); Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1
C.B. 408. See also Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935).
127. See generally Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978), aff'g 67 T.C. 1060
(1977); Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
128. Thus, prior to the promulgation of Treas.. Reg. § 1.482-2(a) (1977), I.R.C. § 482 was
held inadequate to support the judicial right to impute interest on interest free or low interest
loans between related businesses. See, e.g., Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner,
112 F.2d 508, 510 (6th Cir. 1940). Section 482 provides in pertinent part: "In any case of two
or more organizations, trades, or businesses owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the
same interests, the Secretary may . . . allocate gross income . . . among such organizations
- . . if he determines such . . . is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes ..
" The
promulgation of Tress. Reg. § 1.482-2(a) provided the authority necessary for imputing a fair
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If Congress does enact a provision which subjects the use of interest free demand loans to the Federal gift tax, certain guidelines will
be necessary. Congress must adopt a technique for valuation of the
gift that can be consistently applied whenever an interest free demand loan is made.'2 ' If the determination of an effective valuation
method is left to the Commissioner, the courts may again have to
decide whether the method is objective and fair. Proper drafting will
avoid further litigation involving interest free demand loans.
One of the advantages of having Congress resolve the questions
posed by Crown is that if the Commissioner's position is adopted,
it may be limited to prospective application. Thus, the issue of the
Commissioner's power to retroactively apply new interpretations of
the tax law could be avoided.' 30 As the Johnson court noted, retroactive imputation of interest would be unjust since taxpayers would
have no opportunity to reexamine their positions in light of a new
3
provision. '

Congress must also recognize that administrative difficulties
132
would accompany the adoption of the Commissioner's position.
Taxation of interest free demand loans would create problems not
only with assessing use value but also with maintaining records and
detecting tax evasion.' 3 Congress must weigh the benefits to the tax
interest rate on any loan covered by § 482. See, e.g., B. Foreman Co. v. Commissioner, 453
F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1972), a case similar to Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co., where the corporate taxpayer's interest free loan was determined to be within the purview of § 482, resulting
in the imputation of interest.
Prior to the enactment of I.R.C. § 483 in 1964, the courts were reluctant to accept the
Commissioner's attempts to treat part of the purchase price of an interest free installment
sales contract as interest. See, e.g., Clay B. Brown, 37 T.C. 461 (1961), aff'd, 380 U.S. 562
(1965). Section 483 prohibits "a seller from avoiding ordinary income liability by merely
labeling receipts as selling price rather than interest.
Robinson v. Commissioner, 439
F.2d 767, 768 (8th Cir. 1971).
129. One possible method of valuation was presented in Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408.
The Commissioner apparently was influenced by the valuation method used to subject revocable trusts to the gift tax. See TAX MNGM'T, supra note 119 at 6. The ruling states that the
value of the right to the use of money loaned should be determined at the end of each calendar
quarter such use was permitted. However, analogy to revocable trusts is inappropriate. In
contrast to revocable trust situations, valuation of the use of interest free demand loans as
suggested by the Commissioner can only be done after the fact. See notes 86 through 93 supra
and accompanying text.
130. See notes 105 and 106 supra and accompanying text.
131. Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73, 77 (N.D. Tex. 1966). The Crown court
agreed with Johnson that it would be inequitable to apply any change retroactively. 585 F.2d
at 241.
132. See T.C. at 1065. But see Judge Simpson's dissent where he emphasized that administrative problems would be minimal since most family transfers would avoid taxation by
falling within the $3,000 annual exclusion. Id. at 1070 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
133. See Interest Free Loans. supra note 81, at 875.
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system against the burden of effective administration in determining whether interest should be imputed on the use of interest free
demand loans.
CONCLUSION

Clearly, a Congressional response to Crown is mandated. Congress must resolve the conflict betwten two established doctrines.
First, Congress must recognize that a loan is not generally a taxable
transfer and that a taxpayer has no legal duty to charge interest on
a loan for the purpose of reaping a financial gain.' 34 However, a
benefit conveyed for less than adequate and full consideration constitutes a taxable gift within the meaning of section 2501.135 Because
the use of interest free demand loans made between family members
confers a benefit,'36 they should be subjected to the gift tax.
Congress should be cognizant of the social implications of Crown
transfers. Only the wealthy will benefit from the Crown decision,
because any tax imputed on the use of property will usually be less
than the annual gift tax exclusion.' 3 Therefore, subjecting a Crown
transfer to the gift tax may be justified on the social considerations
underlying the gift tax. This tax was implemented to prevent avoidance of estate taxes, which in turn were designed to prevent stagnation of wealth.'8
Congress must take a stand on the Crown issues. Even if Congress
agrees that interest should not be imputed to the use of interest free
demand loans, it should codify this result in order to protect the
lender-taxpayer's legal transfer from possible attack by the Service.' 3' However, thorough analysis should lead Congress to adopt the
Commissioner's position prospectively. The gift tax is intended to
be broad in its coverage, reaching "all the protean arrangements
which the wit of man can devise that are not business transactions
within the meaning of ordinary speech."'' 0 Admittedly, the imputation of interest on Crown transfers would create administrative and
actuarial problems. However, for the gift tax to more effectively
134. See text accompanying notes 55 and 84 supra.
135. See Interest-FreeLoans, supra note 81 at 872.
136. See Green Light, supra note 112 at 261.
137. See Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax
Avoidance, 77 COLUtM. L. REv. 161, 186-87 (1977).
138. See HUGHES, TH FEnls.AL DEAm TAX § 1 (1938).
139. The Service's unwavering position in Crown, Johnson and Rev. Rul. 73-61 indicates
that it will not relent in its attacks on the interest free use of property unless Congress acts
to clarify the law.
140. See Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U,S. 303, 306 (1945).
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supplement the Federal estate and income taxes, interest free demand loans should not be allowed to escape gift taxation.
SHELDON BRAUN

